Wait-and-See or Step in? Dynamics of Interventions
研究委托人与政策制定者之间的关系契约中，何时应干预叫停项目，以平衡防止坏结果与学习政策制定者能力之间的权衡。
We study the optimal intervention policy to stop projects in a relational contract between a principal and a policymaker. The policymaker is privately informed about his ability and privately chooses how much effort to exert. Before a project is completed, the principal receives a signal about its outcome and can intervene to stop it. Intervention may prevent a bad outcome, but no intervention leads to better learning about the policymaker’s ability. In the benchmarks with observable effort or observable ability, optimal intervention follows a threshold rule. With unobservable effort and ability, the optimal policy switches between intervention and no intervention.