Compliance or non‐compliance during financial crisis: Does it matter?
研究了2007-2009年全球金融危机期间，公司是否遵守英国公司治理准则对股东价值的影响，发现不合规会损害股东价值，且董事会独立性的合规比绩效薪酬要求更重要。
Abstract This paper investigates whether shareholder value is affected by non‐compliance with the prescriptions of a principle‐based ‘comply or explain’ system of corporate governance in the context of the global financial crisis of 2007–2009. Using System Generalized Method of Moments estimates to control for different types of endogeneity, the main findings of this paper suggest that non‐compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code adversely affects shareholder value. Furthermore, ex‐post estimates reveal that compliance with certain corporate governance mechanisms is more beneficial than others. With regard to this, compliance with provisions related to board independence is more important than complying with performance‐related pay requirements of the code. These findings have implications for policy makers and financial institutions regarding the usefulness of compliance with a prescribed code of corporate governance, specifically during periods of financial distress.