The core for housing markets with limited externalities
研究了Shapley-Scarf住房市场模型的一种变体，其中消费者同时关心自己的消费和谁得到他们的初始住房，分析了不同偏好下强核心的非空性条件。
Abstract We propose a variant of the housing market model à la Shapley and Scarf (in J Math Econ 1:23–37, 1974) that incorporates a limited form of externality in consumption; that is, agents care both about their own consumption (demand preferences) and about the agent who receives their endowment (supply preferences). We consider different domains of preference relations by taking demand and supply aspects of preferences into account. First, for markets with three agents who have (additive) separable preferences such that all houses and agents are acceptable, the strong core is nonempty; a result that can be neither extended to the unacceptable case nor to markets with a larger number of agents. Second, for markets where all agents have demand lexicographic preferences (or all of them have supply lexicographic preferences), we show that the strong core is nonempty, independent of the number of agents and the acceptability of houses or agents, and possibly multi-valued.