Bail-in and Bailout: Friends or Foes?
研究了内部纾困和外部纾困政策对银行融资成本、贷款监控激励和融资能力的影响，发现内部纾困事后最优但事前会提高银行债务成本并抑制监控激励，严重道德风险下可能导致信贷市场崩溃。
This paper analyzes the effects of bail-in and bailout policies on banks’ funding costs, incentives for loan monitoring, and financing capacity. In a model with moral hazard and two investment stages, a full bail-in turns out to be, ex post, the optimal policy to deal with a failing bank. Unlike a bailout, it allows the government to recapitalize the bank without resorting to distortionary taxes. As a consequence, however, investors expect bail-ins rather than bailouts. Ex ante, this raises banks’ cost of debt and depresses bankers’ incentives to monitor. When moral hazard is severe, this time inconsistency leads to a credit market collapse in which productive projects are not financed, unless the government precommits to an alternative resolution policy. The optimal policy is either a combination of bail-in and bailout—in which the government uses a minimal amount of public transfers to lower banks’ cost of debt—or liquidation, depending on the severity of moral hazard and the shadow cost of the partial bailout. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.