On rational forward-looking behavior in economic geography: An experimental analysis
将新经济地理学模型改编为有限玩家、有限期界的动态迁移博弈，通过实验室实验检验短视行为与理性前瞻行为，发现随着参与者和时期数增加，前瞻行为逐渐被短视行为取代。
This paper adapts the canonical New Economic Geography model for experimental testing of the model's behavioral assumptions by developing a finite-player, finite-horizon dynamic game of migration. Our analysis gives distinctive predictions when migration is consistent with myopic behavior (MB) and when it is consistent with sequentially rational or perfect forward-looking behavior (FB). These alternatives are tested in an economic laboratory experiment with increasing number of agents in different treatments. Results show that perfect FB loses ground against MB as the number of agents and periods increases, and this number may be surprisingly small.