Improving the performance of governmental venture capital firms: Reforms at Shenzhen Capital Group
以深圳创新投资集团为例，展示了政府风险投资公司通过扩张战略、薪酬改革和决策流程优化来缓解代理问题，从而提升投资组合公司IPO或并购退出成功率。
This paper documents how Shenzhen Capital Group (SCG) tackled agency problems faced by governmental venture-capital firms (GVCs) by adopting an expansion strategy and undertaking a series of reforms in its compensation scheme and decision-making process. Empirical results show that after SCG’s reforms, portfolio companies funded by SCG or a SCG-led syndicate were more likely to achieve successful exits through IPO or M&A than those financed by other GVCs. This paper provides evidence and a live example of how GVCs can effectively mitigate agency problems to achieve better performance.