Investors’ Attention to Corporate Governance
利用投资者浏览EDGAR公司文件的独特数据，研究发现投资者会进行治理研究，但关注度集中在大型企业和非春季繁忙代理季的企业，且治理研究通过发声和退出机制影响企业监管，促使管理层减少投资、增加分红。
Abstract Using unique data on investor views of EDGAR company filings, we document that many investors engage in governance research. However, investors’ monitoring is disproportionately focused on large firms and firms with meetings outside the busy spring proxy season. Using an instrumental variables approach that isolates the drop in governance attention during the busy proxy season, we show that governance research is related to investors’ monitoring of firms, through voice and exit. Moreover, governance research disciplines management, who, as a result, reduce investments and increase payouts. The concentration of attention results in joint monitoring of a relatively small subset of firms.