On the Measurement of Environmental Inequality: Ranking Emissions Distributions Generated by Different Policy Instruments
借鉴收入分布文献的方法，用规范指标对不同政策产生的排放分布进行排序，应用于南加州氮氧化物交易计划，发现交易使所有人口群体受益且分布更公平。
Adapting methods from the income distribution literature, we use a normatively significant metric to rank emissions distributions from alternative policies in a manner consistent with an explicit well-behaved preference structure. The approach allows one to determine which policy has the most desirable outcome for a given demographic group as well as which groups benefit most from a given policy. Applying these methods to Southern California’s NOx pollution-trading program and a counterfactual command-and-control policy suggests that in this case trading benefited all demographic groups and generated a more equitable overall distribution of emissions, even after considering the lower aggregate emissions. We find that Blacks experienced the largest gains from RECLAIM relative to the counterfactual, while Hispanics benefited least.