Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in stable matching mechanisms: experimental evidence
通过实验研究稳定匹配机制中战略不确定性如何影响均衡选择，发现风险占优策略（如实报或截断）更常被采用，且截断策略在后期更常见。
Abstract We present experimental evidence on the interplay between strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in stable matching mechanisms. In particular, we apply a version of risk-dominance to compare the riskiness of “truncation” against other strategies that secure against remaining unmatched. By keeping subjects’ ordinal preferences fixed while changing their cardinal representation, our experimental treatments vary the risk-dominant prediction. We find that both truth-telling and truncation are played more often when they are risk-dominant. In both treatments, however, truncation strategies are played more often in later rounds of the experiment. Our results also shed light on several open questions in market design.