The Effect of External Audits: Evidence from Voluntary Audits of Hedge Funds
研究利用对冲基金自愿审计的数据，发现审计基金比未审计基金有更高的激励费率，且高业绩后能吸引更多资本流入，表明投资者认可外部审计的价值。
SYNOPSIS Using the setting of hedge funds, we document two important merits of external audits. We find that incentive fee rates (i.e., performance-based compensation to fund managers) are higher for audited funds than for unaudited funds. In contrast, management fee rates (i.e., fund-size-based compensation to fund managers) do not differ depending on audit status. We also find some evidence that audited funds attract more capital inflows from investors than unaudited funds do after funds report high performance. Our findings indicate that hedge fund investors appreciate the value of external audits.