Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
将带保留价格的序列独裁机制从同质物品扩展到异质物品分配，通过加入中性条件给出该机制的公理刻画，适用于专科门诊预约等场景。
Abstract We adapt a set of mechanisms introduced by Klaus and Nichifor (Econ Theory 70:665–684, 2020), serial dictatorship mechanisms with (individual) reservation prices , to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects, e.g., specialist clinic appointments. We show how the characterization of serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices for homogeneous indivisible objects (Klaus and Nichifor 2020, Theorem 1) can be adapted to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects by adding neutrality : mechanism $$\varphi $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mi>φ</mml:mi> </mml:math> satisfies minimal tradability , individual rationality , strategy-proofness , consistency , independence of unallocated objects , neutrality , and non wasteful tie-breaking if and only if there exists a reservation price vector r and a priority ordering $$\succ $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mo>≻</mml:mo> </mml:math> such that $$\varphi $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mi>φ</mml:mi> </mml:math> is a serial dictatorship mechanism with reservation prices based on r and $$\succ $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mo>≻</mml:mo> </mml:math> .