Political Activism and the Provision of Dynamic Incentives: Growing the Pie in the Battle for Redistribution
研究了在人力资本积累的动态环境中，多数相对贫穷的选民无法承诺未来税率时，政治行动如何限制没收性税收、保护激励，从而避免完全再分配的结果。
Abstract This paper studies the determination of income taxes in a dynamic setting with human capital accumulation. The goal is to understand the factors that support an outcome without complete redistribution, given a majority of relatively poor agents and the inability to commit to future taxes. All agents agree ex ante that limiting tax and transfers is beneficial but a majority favours large redistribution, ex post, at the time of the vote. In a political influence game, group activism limits the support for expropriatory taxation and preserves incentives. In some cases, the outcome corresponds to the optimal allocation under commitment.