Investor Sentiment and Stock Option Vesting Terms
研究发现，在投资者情绪高涨时期，公司授予的股票期权行权期更短、更可能在一年内完全行权，且这种效应在短期投资者持股较多的公司中更显著，短期行权条款与未来并购和资本支出正相关。
Using the details of vesting terms, we document that stock options granted in high-investor-sentiment periods tend to have shorter vesting periods and durations and are more likely to vest completely or have a significantly larger fraction vested within one year of the grant date, relative to low-sentiment periods. We further find that the sentiment effect on vesting terms is more pronounced when firms are largely held by investors with short investment horizons (e.g., transient institutions). Moreover, short vesting terms in high-sentiment periods are positively associated with future mergers-and-acquisitions activity and capital expenditures. Overall, our findings are consistent with theoretical predictions that, in a speculative market, shareholders incentivize managers with short-term-oriented compensation contracts to induce managers to pursue actions maintaining overvaluation. This paper was accepted by Shiva Rajgopal, accounting.