Competing for Talent: Firms, Managers, and Social Networks
研究社会网络如何帮助企业招聘到高能力管理者，发现前员工推荐能提高高能力管理者的招聘率，但对低能力者无显著影响，且对非本地企业、强关系和同社区同伴效果更强。
Abstract Do social networks help firms recruit talented managers? In our setting, firms are randomly connected to prospective young managers through former employees. Under a discrete choice model, we find networks increase the likelihood firms hire high-ability managers, while having no effect on the hiring rate of low-ability managers. Effects are greatest for nonlocal firms, strong ties, and peers living in the same neighborhood. Survey evidence suggests social networks promote recruitment by providing information about firm fundamentals to potential applicants. Our results help rationalize why the majority of managers hold prior connections to the firm.