Laboratory federalism with public funds sharing
研究了在劳动力流动的贫富再分配模型中，公共资金共享方案如何通过演化稳定性纠正分散决策导致的福利损失，并指出其多重均衡和过度再分配的缺陷。
Abstract Laboratory federalism hypothesizes that decentralization fosters innovation and learning in multijurisdictional systems, conducing to good policies. We discuss this using evolutionary stability, focusing in this paper on public funds sharing. In a model of rich‐to‐poor redistribution with labor mobility, where policy choices based on relative success lead to drastic welfare erosion, suitably designed sharing schemes can restore efficiency. Their necessary properties are the same as in a Nash equilibrium, showing they are a powerful corrective device for different modes of government interaction. Two drawbacks appear: reduced accuracy due to large multiplicity and a tendency to overly reward inefficiently high redistribution.