For Richer, for Poorer: Bankers' Liability and Bank Risk in New England, 1867 to 1880
研究了1867至1880年间新英格兰地区婚姻财产法对银行家个人责任的限制如何导致银行杠杆率上升、贷款风险增加和资本损失，对理解有限责任与银行风险的关系有参考价值。
ABSTRACT We study whether banks are riskier if managers have less liability. We focus on New England between 1867 and 1880 and consider the introduction of marital property laws that limited liability for newly wedded bankers. We find that banks with managers who married after a law had higher leverage, delayed loss recognition, made more risky and fraudulent loans, and lost more capital and deposits in the Long Depression of 1873 to 1878. These effects were most pronounced for bankers with the largest reduction in liability. We find no evidence that limiting liability increased firm investment at the county level.