Auditor Appointment Strategy and Intragroup Value Transfers: Evidence From Family Business Groups
研究了家族企业集团中单一审计师与多家审计师任命策略对内部价值转移的影响，发现多家审计师反而加剧转移，但更强的董事会和财务可比性可缓解此效应。
Family business groups (FBGs) typically control several member firms and can hire a single auditor or multiple auditors to audit their member firms. This article examines what type of auditor appointment strategy constrains intragroup value transfers within FBGs. Analyzing related-party transactions (RPTs) within FBGs in Hong Kong, this study provides evidence that FBGs with multiple auditors undertake more intragroup value transfers than FBGs with a single auditor. However, the adverse effect of multiple-auditor appointments is mitigated by a stronger board and higher financial reporting comparability among member firms. Using an alternative measure of intragroup value transfers, we also find that the market perceives multiple-auditor appointments as impairing audit effectiveness. Overall, our findings offer the new insight that controlling families can exploit the appointment of multiple auditors as a “divide and conquer” strategy which undermines the monitoring role of auditors against intragroup value transfers, but stronger corporate governance of member firms can mitigate the adverse effect.