Reference‐dependent preferences, time inconsistency, and pay‐as‐you‐go pensions
在参考依赖效用框架下，论证了现收现付养老金可以与回报更高的私人退休储蓄共存，并提供了非家长式的福利理由。
Abstract The classic Aaron–Samuelson result argues that pay‐as‐you‐go (PAYG) pension schemes cannot coexist with higher‐return, private, retirement‐saving schemes. The ensuing literature shows if agents voluntarily undersave for retirement due to myopia or time‐inconsistency, then a paternalistic, rationale for PAYG pensions arises only if voluntary retirement saving is fully crowded out because of a binding borrowing constraint. This paper generalizes the discussion to the reference‐dependent utility setup of Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) where undersaving happens naturally. No borrowing constraint is imposed. We show it is possible to offer a non‐paternalistic, welfare rationale for return‐dominated, PAYG pensions to coexist with private, retirement saving.