Competitive balance: Information disclosure and discrimination in an asymmetric contest
研究一个努力最大化的委托人在两选手竞赛中，如何通过信息披露和歧视手段来弥补不对称性造成的竞争失衡，并刻画最优歧视水平及其对信息披露选择的影响。
We study a design problem for an effort-maximizing principal in a two-player contest with two dimensions of asymmetry. Players have different skill levels and an information gap exists, as only one player knows the skill difference. The principal has two policy instruments to redress the lack of competitive balance due to asymmetry; she can commit to an information-disclosing mechanism, and she can discriminate one of the players by biasing his effort. We characterize the optimal level of discrimination to maximize aggregate effort, showing how this inextricably determines the choice of information disclosure. Applications are found in newcomer-incumbent situations in an internal labor market, sales-force management, and research contests.