Empirical Models of Lobbying
综述了政治经济学中关于游说的近期实证文献，强调特殊利益政治中的交换与信息问题，并指出游说对均衡政策选择及社会福利影响的量化评估仍是未解难题。
This article offers a review of the recent empirical literature on lobbying within political economy. In surveying extant research, we emphasize quid pro quo and informational issues in special interest politics and highlight crucial open questions in both. The two main unresolved methodological issues remain ( a) how to account for the impact of lobbying on which equilibrium policies are chosen and advanced and ( b) how distorted those equilibrium policies are relative to the social optimum. Of the principal open questions within political economy, a comprehensive, quantitative assessment of the welfare effects of lobbying remains one of the most elusive.