A Meta-Analysis of the Relationship Between Chief Executive Officer Tenure and Firm Financial Performance: The Moderating Effects of Chief Executive Officer Pay and Board Monitoring
通过元分析385项研究（样本量超百万），发现CEO任期与企业财务绩效正相关，且这种关系受CEO薪酬和董事会监督的调节：高现金薪酬或高持股增强正相关，而高长期激励或独立董事比例高则削弱正相关。
Prior empirical research investigating the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) tenure and firms’ financial performance has shown inconclusive results. Based on arguments of agency and behavioral agency theories, we suggest that this relationship is nuanced and may vary depending on CEO pay and board monitoring. In response to these arguments, we meta-analytically test 385 studies ( n = 1,029,602). We find that CEO tenure is positively related to firms’ financial performance. This positive relationship is enhanced when CEOs receive higher cash compensation or hold more stock ownership. On the other hand, the above positive relationship becomes weaker when CEOs receive higher long-term incentives or when the firm has more independent board directors. These findings suggest that CEO pay and board monitoring, or agency mechanisms in general, can offer new research avenues to help explore boundary conditions of the CEO tenure and firms’ financial performance relationship.