Strategic Environmental Policy and the Mobility of Firms
研究了在气候政策不协调的世界中，各国如何非合作地设定排放税，发现当污染企业可流动且污染具有跨界性时，税收会低于自给自足水平，加剧了碳泄漏问题。
The loss of international competitiveness of domestic industries remains a key obstacle to the implementation of effective carbon prices in a world without harmonized climate policies. We analyze countries’ noncooperative choices of emissions taxes under imperfect competition and mobile polluting firms. In our general equilibrium setup with trade, wage effects prevent all firms from locating in the same country. While under local or no pollution countries achieve the first-best, under transboundary pollution taxes are inefficiently low and lower than under autarky where only the “standard” free-riding incentive distorts emissions taxes. This effect is more pronounced when polluting firms are mobile.