Pollution Permits and Financing Costs
研究了欧盟排放交易体系第三阶段中，参与企业的贷款利差如何受合规成本、许可证市场特征和企业策略行为影响，发现利差下降约25%，主要源于低许可证价格、企业主动储存许可证和市场不完全预见。
Abstract Effective environmental policy should consider how the financiers of polluting firms behave. We study phase III of the EU Emission Trading System. Loan spreads for cap‐and‐trade participants are a function of compliance costs, permit market features, and firms’ strategic actions. In contrast with the program intentions, we find that loan spreads fall by approximately 25%. We show that this decrease is almost entirely driven by low permit prices, the firms’ proactiveness to store permits, and imperfect foresight of market conditions in phase III. The drop in spreads cannot be explained by the decline in energy prices and/or other confounding factors.