’Til Dowry Do Us Part: Bargaining and Violence in Indian Families
建立了一个不完全信息下的非合作讨价还价模型，将嫁妆支付、家庭暴力、夫妻间资源分配和分居联系起来，并利用印度反嫁妆法修正案作为自然实验，发现修正案导致女性议价能力下降、分居减少、家庭暴力激增。
Abstract We develop a noncooperative bargaining model with incomplete information linking dowry payments, domestic violence, resource allocation between a husband and a wife, and separation. Our model generates several predictions, which we test empirically using amendments to the Indian antidowry law as a natural experiment. We document a decline in women’s bargaining power and separations and a surge in domestic violence following the amendments. These unintended effects are attenuated when social stigma against separation is low and, in some circumstances, when gains from marriage are high. Whenever possible, parents increase investment in their daughters’ human capital to compensate for lower dowries.