Deposit Insurance and Depositor Behavior: Evidence from Colombia
研究了存款保险对储户行为的影响，利用哥伦比亚保险限额大幅提高的政策变化和银行月度数据，验证了存款在限额处聚集以及保险限额提高促进存款增长，尤其对初始聚集者影响更大。
Abstract This paper studies the effect of deposit insurance on depositor behavior. Our theoretical framework integrates insights from public and financial economics and predicts that (1) deposit insurance induces bunching at the threshold in the deposit distribution and (2) an increase in the insurance threshold promotes deposit growth, particularly higher for individuals bunching at the initial limit. We exploit a large and unexpected increase in the Colombian insurance together with monthly depositor-level records from a major bank to test these predictions. We validate the existence of bunching in deposits and quantify the heterogeneous effect of deposit insurance on individual deposit growth. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.