Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost? A Model with Fiscal Policy
将财政政策纳入Alesina和Gatti的理性党派模型，发现独立中央银行能否实现低通胀且无实际成本，取决于央行保守程度、政党差异及私人部门对选举结果的预期。
In this article we extend the rational partisan model of Alesina and Gatti (1995) to include a second policy, fiscal policy, besides monetary policy. It is shown that the extent to which an independent central bank is successful in attaining price stability depends on the degree of conservativeness of the central bank in relation to the political parties and the private sector's expectations on which party will win the elections. In addition, the inclusion of fiscal policy in Alesina and Gatti's model implies that uncertainty about the course of policy is not a sufficient factor to ensure that, when supply shocks are not relevant, independent central banks bring about low inflation at no real cost.