Cooperation against all predictions
在二进制阈值公共品博弈中，理论预测玩家不合作，但实验显示合作率高达70%至99.7%，研究者提出行为均衡选择概念来解释这一矛盾。
Abstract In Binary Threshold Public Good (BTPG) games, n players have binary choices: cooperation or non‐cooperation. If at least k players cooperate, a public good is produced. The case k = n is the Stag Hunt game with the two pure strategy equilibria E1 (all players cooperate) and E0 (no player cooperates). In four rather diverse examples of four‐player Stag Hunt games, three prominent concepts of equilibrium selection favor E0. Experiments, however, result in cooperation frequencies between 70.3% and 99.7%. Also for k < n , the selected equilibria clearly differ from experimental behavior. We interpret our observations by suggesting the concept Behavioral Equilibrium Selection.