Assessing the Gains from International Macroprudential Policy Cooperation
研究在核心-外围模型中协调与非协调宏观审慎政策的效果，发现即使没有金融摩擦，自利政策制定者也会操纵资产价格，导致长期资本税更高；金融摩擦产生补贴偏差，而自利政策导致长期补贴不足和短期效率差距扩大，合作能带来显著收益。
Abstract We study the effects of coordinated and noncoordinated macroprudential policies in a core–periphery model that emphasizes the role of international financial centers. After documenting empirically the existence of cross‐country macroprudential spillovers and policy interdependence, we derive a number of results. First, even absent financial frictions, self‐oriented policymakers attempt to manipulate asset prices to their advantage, resulting in higher long‐run capital taxes. Second, financial frictions generate a subsidization bias, as policymakers aim at eliminating the inefficiency wedge between the cost of capital and the deposit rate. Third, self‐oriented national policies imply insufficient subsidies in the long run and wider efficiency gaps in the short run, resulting in substantial gains from cooperation.