The Price of Law: The Case of the Eurozone Collective Action Clauses
研究了2013年起欧元区主权债券引入集体行动条款对价格的影响，发现含该条款的债券在二级市场收益率更低，且评级越差、法律体系越强的国家差异越大，表明条款被视为有利于债权人。
Abstract We analyze the price effect of the introduction of collective action clauses (CACs) in newly issued sovereign bonds of eurozone countries as of January 1, 2013. By allowing a majority of creditors to modify payment obligations, such clauses reduce the likelihood of holdouts, while facilitating strategic default by the sovereign. We find that CAC bonds trade in the secondary market at lower yields than otherwise similar no-CAC bonds. The yield differential widens in countries with worse ratings and in those with stronger legal systems, especially if of midrange quality. Hence, CACs are seen as pro- rather than anticreditor provisions.