Monetary Policy with Opinionated Markets
构建了美联储与市场对未来总需求存在分歧的模型，揭示意见分歧如何导致货币政策冲击、市场过度反应及政策权衡，对理解央行沟通与利率决策有参考价值。
We build a model in which the Fed and the market disagree about future aggregate demand. The market anticipates monetary policy “mistakes,” which affect current demand and induce the Fed to partially accommodate the market’s view. The Fed expects to implement its view gradually. Announcements that reveal an unexpected change in the Fed’s belief provide a microfoundation for monetary policy shocks. Tantrum shocks arise when the market misinterprets the Fed’s belief and overreacts to its announcement. Uncertainty about tantrums motivates further gradualism and communication. Finally, disagreements affect the market’s expected inflation and induce a policy trade-off similar to “ cost-push” shocks.