Corporate Governance and Loan-Syndicate Structure
研究发现，股东权利减少会降低风险转移激励，使贷款银团更分散、监控强度降低，基于美国反收购法通过的自然实验验证了公司治理对金融合约和债权人控制的因果影响。
Abstract Firms with greater shareholder rights have a greater risk-shifting incentive, requiring more lender monitoring. Thus, a reduction in shareholder rights implies more diffused (less monitoring-intensive) loan syndicates. Using the passage of U.S. second-generation antitakeover laws as an exogenous shock that reduces shareholder rights as a natural experiment, we find that loan syndicates become significantly more diffuse after the passage of these laws. These results are confirmed in a large sample of bank loans made during the 1990–2007 period when the loan syndicate market matured. Our results show how corporate governance causally affects financial contracting and creditor control in firms.