A case study of bureaucratic discretion: heterogeneous application of market entry regulation in Germany
通过德国市场准入监管的案例，研究发现基层官僚在执法中存在自由裁量权，导致规则在不同地区被系统性差异化应用，对经济学和政治学交叉研究有启示。
Abstract All law is relatively coarse after its initial implementation as the legislature cannot foresee all contingencies that can arise in the actual application of the law. Therefore, decisions need to be made by street-level administrators as novel and particular circumstances arise. Economists have largely ignored the political science literature on street-level bureaucrats, such as policemen, welfare case managers, or regulatory agents. I present a case study in the context of market entry regulation in Germany. Qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that bureaucratic discretion exists, that is, administrative actions can be found on different ends of a decision space, and that its effects are potentially large. Administrators do not apply legislation in a uniform manner and we observe a systematically different application of rules across subnational jurisdictions.