New business as a bargaining factor in audit pricing: evidence from emission trading schemes
研究审计师是否将新业务作为审计定价的议价筹码，以中国碳排放权交易试点为准自然实验，发现强制参与导致审计费用上升，且该效应在客户重要性较低、财务总监无事务所经验、签字审计师学历较高时更显著。
In this study, we examine whether auditors use a new business as a bargaining chip in audit pricing. Taking the launch of China’s pilot regional emissions-trading schemes (ETSs) as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that mandatory participation in an ETS results in increased audit fees subsequent to implementation of the regulation. Adopting both empirical and textual analyses to exclude three alternative explanations (auditing effort, audit risk, and reporting risk), our results suggest that a new business is used as a bargaining chip by auditors when they negotiate audit fees with their clients. Additional empirical tests suggest that pilot companies experience an increase in audit fees after ETS implementation only when the companies have less importance to the auditors, companies' CFOs do not have experience working in an accounting firm and signing auditors are better educated. These findings demonstrate that the mandatory implementation of an ETS creates a new accounting business and alters the auditor–auditee bargaining dynamics.