Structural Reforms and Elections: Evidence from a World-Wide New Dataset
利用新构建的覆盖90个国家的改革与选举数据库，发现自由化改革的经济效益随时间逐渐显现，因此在临近选举时实施改革对执政党不利，且经济衰退时改革会受惩罚，扩张时则可能获奖励。
Abstract We present two new databases we have constructed to explore the electoral consequences of structural economic policy reforms. One database measures reforms in domestic finance, external finance, trade, product, and labor markets covering 90 advanced and developing economies from 1973 to 2014. The other chronicles the timing and results of national elections. We find that liberalizing reforms are associated with economic benefits that accrue only gradually over time. Because of this delay, liberalizing reforms are costly to democratic incumbents when they are implemented close to elections. Electoral outcomes also depend on the state of the economy: Reforms are penalized during contractions but are often rewarded in expansions.