The Impact of Presidential Appointment of Judges: Montesquieu or the Federalists?
研究通过司法改革中法官年龄结构的外生变化，发现总统任命法官会削弱法治，即使司法与总统之间仅有一度分离也会产生影响。
A central question in development economics is whether there are adequate checks and balances on the executive. This paper provides causal evidence of how increasing constraints on the executive—via removal of presidential discretion in judicial appointments—promotes the rule of law. The age structure of judges at the time of the reform and the mandatory retirement age law provide us with an exogenous source of variation in the termination of presidential discretion in judicial appointments. Overall, the results indicate that presidential appointment of judges deteriorates the rule of law. Even one degree of separation between the judiciary and the president matters.