Self‐reporting and Market Structure
研究了寡头市场中自我报告机制对监管效果的影响，发现其有效性取决于竞争程度，且最优政策常伴随更多竞争和更低合规率。
Many regulators utilize self‐reporting, that is, wrongdoers reporting their own crimes to the authority, to enforce regulations in a variety of market contexts. This paper studies the effectiveness of self‐reporting within the context of an oligopoly. We identify two important consequences of implementing self‐reporting (relative to no‐reporting) for a welfare‐maximizing regulator. First, if the regulator can control only the audit probability and fine, then whether compliance rises or falls upon implementing self‐reporting depends on the level of competition. Second, if the regulator can also control the market size, then the welfare‐maximizing policy entails self‐reporting but with more competition and lower compliance than under no‐reporting.