The management of talent: Optimal contracting for selection and incentives
研究了组织在员工拥有私人努力成本信息和努力不可观测的双重挑战下，如何设计雇佣契约以将员工分配到不同项目，发现最优契约将高分配概率与低成功奖金配对，有时对高努力成本员工提供固定工资。
Abstract Optimally reallocating human capital to tasks is key for an organization to successfully navigate a transition. We study how to design employment contracts to allocate employees to different valuable projects within an organization given two simultaneous challenges: The employees have private information about their cost of effort, and they exert unobservable effort. The optimal contract menu pairs a higher probability of assignment to a valuable project with a lower bonus in case of success. In limited cases, a fixed salary may be offered to employees with high effort cost. We link our results to job design features encountered in practice.