Optimal Corporate Taxation Under Financial Frictions
研究了政府在公司面临金融约束且投资机会信息不对称时，如何设计最优公司税。发现对股息和股票回购征税（即支付税）能区分受约束与不受约束的公司并有效筹集收入，从利润税转向支付税可使企业总价值增加7%。
Abstract This article studies the optimal design of corporate taxes when firms have private information about future investment opportunities and face financial constraints. A government whose goal is to efficiently raise a given amount of revenue from its corporate sector should attempt to tax unconstrained firms, which value resources inside the firm less than financially constrained firms. We show that a corporate payout tax (a tax on dividends and share repurchases) can both separate constrained and unconstrained firms and raise revenue and is therefore optimal. Our quantitative analysis implies that a revenue-neutral switch from profit taxation to payout taxation would increase the overall value of existing firms and new entrants by $7\%$. This switch could be implemented in the current US tax system by making retained earnings fully deductible.