Regulation of Compensation and Systemic Risk: Evidence from the UK
研究了2010年英国薪酬法规对银行高管决策视野和风险承担激励的影响，发现该法规降低了银行对系统性风险的贡献，但也导致CEO非自愿离职率上升，产生意外后果。
ABSTRACT This paper studies the consequences of regulating executive compensation at financial institutions by examining the introduction of the UK Remuneration Code in 2010, which aimed to change the decision‐making horizon and risk‐taking incentives of bank executives. We find that, although both banks and nonbanks show increased contribution and sensitivity to systemic risk in the United Kingdom post‐2010, this increase is lower for UK banks, in line with the intent of the regulation. However, UK banks also experience higher unforced CEO turnover when compared to other UK firms. Therefore, while the regulation may have had the desired effect on systemic risk, it may also have given rise to some unintended consequences.