Auditor‐client reciprocity: Evidence from forecast‐issuing brokerage houses and forecasted companies sharing the same auditor
研究审计师是否将部分客户的私有信息分享给券商客户，以换取未来业务机会；发现共享审计师的券商对公司盈利预测更准确，且这种准确性受成本和激励因素影响。
Abstract We examine whether auditors share private information about some clients in their portfolio to benefit other clients (i.e., brokerage houses). This is a salient issue in China, where there are concerns about auditors leaking information to related parties, and where we observe variation in connectedness between brokerage houses and companies through shared auditors. We document that brokerage houses that share an auditor with a company issue comparatively more accurate earnings forecasts for that company. Next, cross‐sectional variation in forecast accuracy is associated with several proxies for brokerage houses' and auditors' costs and incentives to share information (e.g., investor protection, media coverage, public listing status, and the client's economic importance). Finally, auditors are more likely to secure future audits from IPO deals sponsored by brokerage house clients with higher forecast accuracy. Collectively, our evidence is suggestive of auditors sharing private information with brokerage houses in anticipation of reciprocity in the form of lucrative future engagements.