Designing Effective Teacher Performance Pay Programs: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania*
通过坦桑尼亚全国性实地实验，比较了两种公立小学教师绩效薪酬方案：排名锦标赛制与多级达标制，发现两者均能提升学生成绩，但多级达标制更易实施且成本效益更高。
Abstract We use a nationally representative field experiment in Tanzania to compare two teacher performance pay systems in public primary schools: a ‘pay-for-percentile’ system (a rank-order tournament) and a ‘levels’ system that features multiple proficiency thresholds. Pay for percentile can potentially induce socially optimal effort among teachers, while levels systems can encourage teachers to focus on students near passing thresholds. Despite the theoretical advantage of the tournament system, we find that both systems improved student test scores across the distribution of initial learning levels after two years. However, the levels system is easier to implement and is more cost effective.