The Selection of Talent: Experimental and Structural Evidence from Ethiopia
通过埃塞俄比亚的实地实验，研究劳动力市场搜索摩擦如何影响企业招聘人才，发现小额申请激励能吸引更多优秀求职者，且当地招聘者低估了其效果。
We study how search frictions in the labor market affect firms’ ability to recruit talented workers. In a field experiment in Ethiopia, we show that an employer can attract more talented applicants by offering a small monetary incentive for making a job application. Estimates from a structural model suggest that the intervention is effective because the cost of making a job application is large, and positively correlated with jobseeker ability. We provide evidence that this positive correlation is driven by dynamic selection. In a second experiment, we show that local recruiters underestimate the positive impacts of application incentives.