Peer Effects in Corporate Governance Practices: Evidence from Universal Demand Laws
利用各州通用需求法分阶段实施，识别并估计了董事会连锁公司之间治理政策的因果同群效应，发现反收购条款的采纳存在同群效应，且该效应可能通过连锁董事的治理经验传导。
Abstract Firms in the same networks tend to have similar corporate governance practices. However, disentangling peer effects, where governance practices propagate from one firm to another, from selection effects, where firms with similar preferences self-select into linked groups, is difficult to do. Studying board-interlocked firms, we utilize the staggered adoption of universal demand laws across states to identify and estimate causal peer effects in governance policies. We find support for the existence of peer effects in the adoption of antitakeover provisions. The impact of universal demand laws on the governance experience of interlocking directors likely explains these effects.