Imperfect tacit collusion and asymmetric price transmission
通过实验室实验研究不对称价格传递，发现不完全默契合谋是其主要原因；不同卖家数量（除双寡头外）均出现类似不对称性，且卖家在负面冲击后定价高于最佳反应水平。
We investigate asymmetric price transmission (APT) in laboratory experiments and find that imperfect tacit collusion is likely the cause in our otherwise frictionless markets. We vary the number of sellers across markets to evaluate the role competition plays in APT. We report similar magnitudes of asymmetry in markets with 3, 4, 6, and 10 sellers, but not in duopolies. Furthermore, sellers consistently set their prices above the best-response levels implied by their forecasts, particularly in periods following negative shocks. We interpret these pricing deviations as sellers’ intentions to collude, and note that they mechanically drive the pricing asymmetries we observe.