No reliance on guidance: counter‐signaling in management forecasts
研究发现，业绩优异和陷入困境的公司都会选择不发布盈利指引，而中等表现的公司则发布，这是一种反向信号传递行为，且市场不会因此惩罚高能力管理者。
Abstract This study presents and provides an explanation for a novel stylized fact: both high‐performing and troubled companies withhold issuing earnings guidance. We assume that the manager's ability affects the level of earnings and the accuracy of guidance, but issuing a forecast is costless for all manager types. Managers are thus able to signal their ability through accuracy in their forecasts. While high ability managers would seem to benefit the most from issuing guidance, in equilibrium we find that both high and low ability managers withhold issuing guidance, while intermediate types forecast. Hence, high ability managers counter‐signal in equilibrium, which does not result in a subsequent “punishment” by the market.