Activist-Appointed Directors
研究发现，由活动家提名的独立董事能显著提升公司价值，尤其当这些董事有私营企业经验且提名者继续持股时，这种提升长期存在且超过无董事任命的行动事件。
Abstract We examine the value impact of independent directors nominated by activists (Activist IDs). Firms appointing Activist IDs experience larger value increases than firms appointing other directors, particularly when Activist IDs have private firm experience and when their nominators remain as shareholders. This value increase persists over a long period and is greater than that of activism events without director appointments. The increase is also higher among firms with greater monitoring needs and entrenched boards. Moreover, the appointments of Activist IDs are greeted more positively by the market, and Activist IDs obtain more favorable shareholder votes and additional future directorships.