Bribery, hold‐up, and bureaucratic structure
研究了外国投资者在腐败但关心国内福利的官僚体制下进行基础设施投资时，贿赂对国内福利的影响，并分析了官僚集权程度和关怀程度变化对福利的非单调效应。
Abstract We consider infrastructure provision by a foreign investor when the domestic bureaucracy is corrupt, but also cares for domestic welfare. Bureaucrats bargain with the investor over price and (potentially) bribes, both before the investment is sunk and afterwards, using the threat of expropriation. We show that domestic welfare may be greater in equilibria with bribery than in equilibria without. We specify conditions under which changes in the degree of bureaucratic centralization or of bureaucratic care have a positive, negative, or nonmonotonic effect on domestic welfare. The impact of centralization on domestic welfare is mediated through the level of bureaucratic care.