Board Monitoring and Advising in Dynamic Agency
模型分析表明，在合同可重新谈判时，低董事会活动可能对股东更有利，因为它能部分抵消重新谈判对经理激励的扭曲，但需要董事会咨询对绩效指标的强测量效应来实施。
Intuition suggests that shareholders benefit from active boards. We present a model to show that if contract renegotiation is possible, then an active board might not always be desirable from the shareholders' perspective. This happens because low board activity may partially offset the distortion in the manager's incentives caused by the renegotiation option. While the value of low board activity stems from the board's weak monitoring, a strong measurement effect of the board's advising in the manager's performance measures is necessary to implement it. In this case, a sufficiently independent board motivates a low level of board activity.