Come Together: Firm Boundaries and Delegation
通过全球数千家企业的数据，研究企业边界与内部决策权分配，发现整合赋予企业根据生产问题解决者来授权或集权的选择权，且企业更可能整合生产高价值投入品和处于生产率更分散行业的供应商。
Abstract We jointly study firm boundaries and the allocation of decision rights within them by confronting an incomplete-contracts model with data on vertical integration and delegation for thousands of firms around the world. Integration has an option value: it confers authority to delegate or centralize decision rights, depending on who can best solve problems that arise in the course of an uncertain production process. In line with the model’s predictions, we find that firms are more likely to integrate suppliers that produce more valuable inputs and operate in industries with more dispersed productivity, and that firms delegate more decisions to integrated suppliers that produce more valuable inputs and operate in more productive industries.