Long‐Term Contracting With Time‐Inconsistent Agents
研究天真现时偏好的消费者与风险中性企业之间的契约，发现随着契约期限延长，现时偏好导致的福利损失会消失，但在企业不了解消费者现时偏好或无法提供排他性契约时则不会消失。
We study contracts between naive present‐biased consumers and risk‐neutral firms. We show that the welfare loss from present bias vanishes as the contracting horizon grows. This is true both when bargaining power is on the consumers' and on the firms' side, when consumers cannot commit to long‐term contracts, and when firms do not know the consumers' naiveté. However, the welfare loss from present bias does not vanish when firms do not know the consumers' present bias or when they cannot offer exclusive contracts.